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The 1990 European Community was taken by surprise, by the urgency of 
demands from the newly-elected Eastern European governments to become 
member countries. Those governments were honouring the mass social 
movement of the streets, the year before, demanding free elections and a 
liberal economic system associated with “Europe”. The mass movement had 
actually been accompanied by much activity within institutional politics, in 
Western Europe, the former “satellite” states, the Soviet Union and the 
United States, to set up new structures – with German reunification and an 
expanded EC as the centre-piece. 
This paper draws on the writer’s doctoral dissertation on mass media in the 
collapse of the Eastern bloc, focused on the Berlin Wall – documenting both 
public protests and institutional negotiations. For example the writer as a 
correspondent in Europe from that time, recounts interventions of the 
German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, at a European summit in Paris nine days 
after the “Wall”, and separate negotiations with the French President, 
Francois Mitterrand -- on the reunification, and EU monetary union after 
1992. Through such processes, the “European idea” would receive fresh 
impetus, though the EU which eventuated, came with many altered 
expectations. It is argued here that as a result of the shock of 1989, a “social” 
Europe can be seen emerging, as a shared experience of daily life -- 
especially among people born during the last two decades of European 
consolidation.  
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The paper draws on the author’s major research, in four parts: (1) Field 
observation from the strategic vantage point of a news correspondent. This 
includes a treatment of evidence at the time, of the wishes and intentions of 
the mass public (including the unexpected drive to join the European 
Community), and those of governments, (e.g. thoughts of a “Tienanmen 
Square solution” in East Berlin, versus the non-intervention policies of the 
Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev). (2) A review of coverage of the crisis of 
1989 by major news media outlets, treated as a history of the process. (3) As 
a comparison, and a test of accuracy and analysis; a review of conventional 
histories of the crisis appearing a decade later.(4) A further review, and test, 
provided by journalists responsible for the coverage of the time, as reflection 
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Introduction: 
 
The idea of a common “Europe” took a step further in its development with 
the “Wall” events of October – November 1989.  In Eastern Europe crowds 
in the street were proclaiming identity with “Europe”, a pointed demand for 
separation from the Soviet Union, and an idea compatible with seeking to 
share in the economic prosperity of the Western Europeans. The Soviet 
President, Mikhail Gorbachev, shared in this consolidated view of Europe. In 
his desperate campaign for assistance from abroad, the call for sharing of a 
“common European home” was a theme of his speaking appearances, at 
Bonn, Paris, or at the European Parliament in Strasbourg (18.8.89). 
The then European Community (EC) was already giving institutional shape 
to a generalised European entity, and this was no myth; the “1992” proposals 
for a completed single market, open internal frontiers and the Euro were 
being acted on concertedly. All would accelerate after 1992 and achievement 
of the consolidating Maastricht Treaty, as the East European states added 
great pressure to take things still further. Having had their revolutions, and 
having chosen new, non-communist governments at free elections in 1990, 
they had immediately sought to make formal applications to join the EC; and 
Western Europe was unready.  
Nine days after the opening of the Berlin Wall, Saturday night 18.11.89, the 
twelve EC Heads of Government met in Paris for a special summit, to 
receive a briefing from Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG). He raised the prospect of a reunified “Germany within 
Europe”, as opposed to a “German Europe”; the restored country would have 
to be a democracy and Germany would remain bound to the “1992” program 
for European unity; and so a constitutional, united Europe might absorb and 
provide reassurance against old nationalisms and fear of hegemony. 
Yet the EC was slow to grasp the suddenly emerging new reality of a wider, 
and in aggregate poorer democratic Europe. As leaders huddled over the 
Maastricht plan, certain among them, viz Margaret Thatcher of the United 
Kingdom, equivocated on it, and looked for options to avoid German 
reunification -- along with any form of federal Europe that might frame it.  
Journalists based at the large European Commission media centre in Brussels 
averred that as they proceeded into 1990 they did not see great expansion, 
Eastwards, as part of the news agenda; and were not briefed that way by 
politicians or officials. The impetus actually would come from the East. A 
long serving gallery member, Geoff Meade (1999), Europe Editor for the UK 
Press Association, had thought of the revolution as a “tabloid event” where 
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facts did not require explanation, and it then turned out to have unexpectedly 
far-reaching implications. When the EC began offering technical assistance 
to Eastern Europe, it missed the point that they wanted more than practical 
aid:  
“The bulk of our coverage overlooked the direct and huge 
ramifications for the European Community... The EC itself was 
taken by surprise; it was like hearing of an earthquake; there were 
difficulties in understanding this challenge to all expectations, with 
this biblical movement of people in the early days of it. We all got it 
wrong. We thought of aid not expansion, and covered the day to day 
reactions from the Commission … We could not see, for years, 
where it would lead.” 
His colleague from across the briefing table, European Commission 
Spokesman, Niko Weghter (1999), recalled a 1990 visit  to Eastern Europe 
with a Commissioner, astonished to find himself confronted with demands 
fast-tracked EC admission. 
“All meetings from December 1989 into 1990 confirmed this 
inclination to prepare for membership …When we saw Tadeus 
Mazowiecki  [Polish Prime Minister] the first question was when 
can we join the EC; and in Prague they said forget previous 
relationships, forget Comecon, forget the Soviet Union, forget the 
neighbours, there was one alternative for them. They wanted to be 
part of the West. There was talk that we understood, of a 
‘psychological desire to be part of a family’… People on the street 
in these countries know their future depends to an extent on 
Brussels.” 
The present writer as a correspondent in 1989 attended to report on many of 
the key gatherings and speeches, talk with some of the principals and best 
informed observers, and in Eastern Europe share time with thousands of 
people conducting their movement in the streets. Therefore, he has come by 
an anecdotal route to form conclusions about the way that the fall of the 
Berlin Wall was a signal of the arrival of a new and consolidated Europe, a 
new expression of the European idea. 
As the events of 1989 and 1990 proceeded all were faced with an 
“imagination gap”; there could be no assurance as to where those events 
might lead; journalists might have to report that the Berlin Wall could soon 
be breached, or that the Soviet Union might disintegrate, but could not 
believe it themselves. In the aftermath there was time to analyse the historical 
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processes of which the events in the news had formed a part, to reflect, and 
try to determine how well, or badly, reporting on the day reflected the actual 
pattern of developments. 
 
Project of Research  
The research reported here on the Berlin Wall was undertaken to settle some 
questions about the full character and significance of what had occurred in 
1989. The research problem became:- By what process did the post-war geo-
political settlement in Europe collapse, and noting the ubiquitous presence of 
mass media, what roles did media have to play in that process? Given that the 
collapse was an important realignment of power and a psychological shock, 
it would be an obvious topic for study; the media perspective was in  the field 
of expertise of this researcher, so the effort was made to assess whether the 
media role would be marginal or very significant, and in which ways. In the 
event the two parts of the study would interact comprehensively. Studying 
media products and the work of journalists would show, dependably it would 
transpire, how history was being made. The narrative of the collapse of the 
communist states resolved itself into certain broad themes, to do with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, German reunification and the expansion of the 
European Union – with archived media accounts proving the best ready 
guide and source of facts and interpretation of the process of history.          
 
Methodology 
The experience of reporting in 16 European countries including the USSR, 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) 
and Romania was initial field work for the study – highly impressionistic 
observation. In the aftermath, diaries, news products by the writer and 
contacts with others, viz colleagues from international news media, 
contributed to the background understanding; and this led into a doctoral 
project completed in 2002.    
That study was undertaken in the following parts: (a) A contents review of a 
sample of “quality” media outlets committed to chronicling major events 
(The Times, International Herald Tribune, Weekend Guardian with Le 
Monde, The Australian, and Australian ABC Radio and Television News), 
for the six-months period 1.7.89 to 31.1.90, see Appendix 1. Themes were 
extracted forming an historical narrative, noting the published reports on 
events and commentaries to do with the unravelling of the situation in 
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Eastern Europe. Altogether 5297 news reports, newspaper features or current 
affairs pieces for radio or television were noted; 455 by the writer himself. 
(b) Histories of that process appearing in the decade after the “Wall” were 
consulted. (c) A panel of 23 journalists – American, Australia, British, 
French and German – who worked on the coverage took part in semi-
structured interviews to reflect on practice during the time of crisis. 
The parts in this triangulated approach produced substantially the same 
results, delivering a conclusion that the daily coverage by leading Western 
news media judged in terms of accuracy and perspective was successful. As 
the events of 1989 were marked by massive public protests, additional 
reading for this project also included the literature on mass social movements 
(See Gamson 1968, 1975; Kahn and Zald 1990; McAdam et al 1996; 
Oberschall 1973; Rushing and Zald 1976; Tarrow 1995). 
 
Analysis 
The treatment of the data that emerged from this study delivered the 
following interpretation of what took place: It was a two-track process, on 
one hand a mass social movement, on the other a playing out of decisions in 
the domain of institutional politics, mostly government to government 
interaction at international level. For journalists monitoring it, the task would 
be to accompany the crowds, and obtain information of one kind, and then to 
revert to the more accustomed business of dealing with the powerful – in this 
case, both East and West, often shaken and themselves uncertain of what was 
occurring. Participants had the sensation of witnessing collapse in Europe, 
which moved through the strongest bastions of authoritarian control, in East 
Berlin, Prague or Bucharest, and would extend towards Moscow. Very early 
however the now orthodox, converse view emerged that the source was in the 
Soviet Union, causing the European change. 
 
Soviet crisis precipitates the change in Europe  
Contemporary analysis was diagnosing the USSR as in terminal crisis, an 
unbalanced economy with an expensive, productive military and scientific 
sector, and severely neglected consumer sector, the source of social discord 
and dysfunction. American estimates had defence taking 16% of GDP, 
$US250-billion p.a. in 1990, equalling the United States, on a far smaller 
economic base (Moynahan 1994 399).  By Gorbachev’s own account a long 
run of low export prices for oil, the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, and 
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earthquake disaster in Armenia had been bankrupting the state. Mortality 
rates were deteriorating, alcoholism rife, dietary abuse extensive.  
Where the Kruschev goal of matching the United States in heavy industrial 
production was actually achieved, the West had moved on to employing ever 
more efficient economic models. The Guardian Moscow correspondent 
Martin Walker (1993 233-34, 282, 328; 1999) articulated a plausible view 
that modernisation specifically through the advent of computers had sealed 
the Cold War fate of the USSR. Electronic data processing had accompanied 
and made possible financial liberalisation, and with it more thorough and 
rapid utilisation of  resources. The weak communications infrastructure of 
the Soviet Union, with for instance ten phone lines per hundred of 
population, often of low quality, versus 80 in the United States (Moynaham 
1994 401) worsened it. Unable to obtain capital to bankroll a refurbishment 
the system went into rapid decline. In this climate secessionist movements in 
the Soviet republics emerged in strength, so that violent outbreaks, like the 
nationalistic conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, were actually a more 
sensational sign of the times than the far more peaceful eruptions in Eastern 
Europe. 
The media record prepared by this writer produced a telling coincidence of 
dates, showing that whenever Gorbachev was away campaigning in the 
West, a new violent upsurge would take place somewhere in the republics. 
Pressing on with his reform projects for perestroika and glasnost, against 
growing panic and resistance within Party and government, the psychological 
pressure on the man Gorbachev was something to be guessed at.      
The Gorbachev “roadshow” in Europe certainly brought home the crisis to 
observers. Facing the  unilateral determination of his administration to get 
out of the arms race, American negotiators would be surprised at sessions 
held in Western Europe, with sudden concessions on reducing armaments, 
notably the controversial intermediate range missiles, and conventional force 
levels. More strategically for the present argument, Mikhail Gorbachev let it 
be known the USSR would no longer rescue the Eastern Bloc governments in 
a crisis. There would be no crushing costs of any kind to preserve them; no 
more interventions as in Berlin 1953, Budapest 1956 or Prague 1968; priority 
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Gorby, save us 
The first demonstration of that reality had been the victory of Solidarity in 
the Polish elections of 4 and 18 June 1989. Inability to create wealth could 
not be hidden by 1989. Poles joked bitterly: “We pretend to work and they 
pretend to pay us.” The visit of the Polish Pope in 1979, and again in 1983, 
had seen the citizens organise their own crowd control and literally turn their 
backs on the communist police. Amid renewed economic crisis the Solidarity 
union movement forced the regime to the round table. A negotiated 
settlement gave the communist party a bloc of guaranteed seats at open 
elections, but it failed to win even three contested seats it needed to keep a 
majority in the joint houses of parliament. Repeated contacts by the outgoing 
government with Moscow produced no intervention from Gorbachev, who 
congratulated the winners. Taxi drivers commented on the shuttling to 
Moscow: “Papa, Papa!”, they laughed. Incredible as it seemed at the time, 
the parties talked on towards an inevitable, actual transfer of power -- and 
word spread outside of Poland that change, after all, might be admitted. 
By the Fortieth anniversary celebrations of the German Democratic Republic 
(GDR) in early October, thousands of people there, also had tested the new 
circumstances, in their Trabant-born exodus through Hungary. In that 
country of “Goulash communism” of the preceding decades, a reform faction 
was emboldened to push for control of the Party, and opened the frontier 
with Austria. 
Consequently the issue of hundreds of entry visas to East Berlin to the 
international media, to mark the country’s anniversary, occurred in a climate 
of palpable crisis and rebellion. Thousands of demonstrators gathered on the 
Alexanderplatz famously shouting out to the guest of honour: “Gorby, save 
us!” Gorbachev was not wholly restrained in his dealings with the die-hard 
East German regime. “Those who cannot keep up with the march of history 
will fall by the wayside”, he told the Workers’ Party, and let his 
spokesperson, Gennady Gerasimov, tell journalists about it. He reiterated the 
message in an impromptu speech in the street, while visiting a war memorial. 
Western correspondents, including this writer, scrambled to improvise a 
chain of translations from Russian, to German then English. The Gorbachev 
manoeuvre was to promote change within the East German communist party 
but its ramifications went far further. 
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The power of the street and the corridors of power 
Formal or institutional politics was giving ground to the very unexpected, 
including actions taken by citizens, seizing on opportunity. Mass social 
movements will usually follow a familiar course; Eastern Europe no 
exception: 
• They will focus on an ongoing grievance among publics. 
• Some crisis or weakening of authority will bring out numbers in 
protest. 
• Curiously these oppositionist forces will look for a model of action 
and find it in the past, hence resort to barricades as in the 19th 
century, or mass parades. 
• Recalling that movements arise when the regime is off-balance, the 
protests have force;  unsurprisingly they grow very rapidly, and fear 
evaporates. 
• The movements have demands, which are represented in very 
succinct, very targeted short statements, hence, everywhere in 1989: 
Communist party to resign; remove any mention of its leading role 
from the constitution; hold free elections; permit full human rights 
and a demand economy, and in Germany, restore the single 
Fatherland. 
• The movements find leaders as well, or the leaders find them; 
trusted and experienced oppositionists, would-be reformers from 
within made marginal by the government, or custodians of 
conscience, found often in churches. 
• The movements being very young and improvised, in 1989 coming 
from a void in civil society, when citizens could hardly organise 
public life for themselves, had no standing and enduring structures – 
no branches or councils, budgets or bank accounts, membership lists 
or cards. 
• Inevitably such movements must divide and fragment, unable to 
sustain their intense activity and solidarity; so they would hurry to 
get results. 
• To compensate for lack of orthodox political resources, they would 
use mass media.  Even bad publicity could count as good attention-
getting in this connection; messages going out via media would 
sustain gatherings, e.g. “same time, same place, next week”; 
reporters for their part would revel in the strength of a story 
involving a tribe up in arms. 
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Late 1989 was a time for mass social movements on a classic plan.  
In Czechoslovakia movement politics carried the dissidents around Vaclav 
Havel to government within a year. Yet as the process there wound down, 
from the November days of the Velvet Revolution in Wenceslaus Square and 
the “Magic Lantern” theatre, through sometimes bitter wrangles with the 
other side, one of the principals was expressing the anxieties of many as to 
the possible flimsiness of power from the street: “We can’t continue with this 
anarchist democracy, with everything based on good will and working 
twenty-four hours a day. We shall have to change into a proper, organised 
political force”, said Jan Urban, of Civic Forum, December 1989. 
Even amid the shock of rebellion; business still needed to be done. 
Institutional politics, the politics of government, diplomacy, the corridors of 
power would adapt and reassert itself. The abdication of the Nomenkatura 
had created vacuums and unsettled questions, which  political establishments, 
everywhere, set out to try and resolve. 
 By Saturday 4 November in Berlin one million people in the street were 
demonstrating impatience, for certain express changes, like resignation of the 
communist government, and a free vote. They were unafraid. A month 
before, an arcane chain of events had put to bed the fear of a European 
“Tienanmen solution”, in the city of Leipzig. It was a mix of formal politics, 
if only in the guise of the collapsing GDR regime, together with the politics 
of the movement. Facts were muddled but enough was brought to light, and 
confirmed over time. 
 
The GDR fiasco and the ‘China solution’ 
The shadow of the massacre at Tienanmen Square (4.6.89) had been hanging 
over the political unravelling in East Germany. As the foreign media army 
reported the degeneration of the Fortieth anniversary event into a full-pitched 
public revolt; another visit to East Berlin, that of the Deputy Prime Minister 
of China, YaoYulin, had raised thoughts of  perhaps a very bad outcome. 
It was not Western news media on their own which began public speculation 
that the GDR, a rigid post-Stalinist regime, would attempt to save itself 
through violence. Threats were made by the regime itself, quickly noted by 
the visiting journalists, many of whom had been at Tienanmen Square, less 
than five months before. Dissident leaders in East Berlin associated with the 
Protestant Church had passed on to correspondents, that they’d been told by a 
senior government official to “remember China”. Whether a realistic threat 
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or  bluff to discourage protest, it was inflammatory with more to come. The 
State President, Erich Honecker, referred to the June events in Beijing while 
hosting a function for Deputy Premier Yao, and his wife, Margot Honecker, a 
Minister, spoke of  an armed workers’ militia, ready, she said, to defend the 
revolution. (That armed formation, it transpired, had been much wound down 
over the years). 
After the weekend Anniversary demonstrations attention shifted to the 
growing parades of defiance each Monday night in Leipzig. In a much-
investigated incident, 9.10.89, Honecker demanded that the protest be put 
down in an exemplary way. Troops and police were issued with live 
ammunition; authorities on the ground reported to their superiors that the 
crowd   was growing much bigger than expected. Troops in East Berlin had 
followed a procedure of containing and catching protestors rather than 
dispersing them; the same could make for a volatile situation. 
The sources for several reports on the proposed crack-down were mostly 
communist officials, from the divided and disintegrating state apparatus. 
Three American writers published what became close to the standard account 
(Binder et al 1989). They said Egon Krenz as security chief travelled to 
Leipzig to countermand an order to shoot, continuing: “‘There was a written 
order from Honecker for a Chinese solution’, said Marcus Wolf, the retired 
head of Germany’s spy agencies … But by then many in the politburo had 
come to the decision  that Mr Honecker had to go. In Leipzig, Kurt Mansur, 
the director of the Gerwandhaus music theatre, and some local party officials 
opened urgent discussions on averting a clash. When tens of thousands took 
to the streets of Leipzig that night the police did not interfere. The 
‘revolution from below’ was under way…” .   
Other reports said Krenz had fallen out with Honecker and had intervened at 
Leipzig by telephone from the capital. In the event, later in October Erich 
Honecker was stripped of his official positions and a new politburo 
assembled to face the coming storm. 
Why didn’t an atrocity happen? East Germany was far from isolated and with 
the advance of communication technologies it had become impossible for 
authorities to keep out news of events around the country. The numbers alone 
in Leipzig were unanswerable, building up from 1200 people in the previous 
September, to 500000 by 6 November. Western television was received 
throughout most of East Germany; telephone links to the West had become 
rather easy; even pictures shot on small amateur video cameras were being 
regularly smuggled to outside television stations. The mass social movement 
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of the day was able to use witnessing mass media to protect its members, to a 
good degree. 
Some weeks later the Leipzig demonstrations became the scene for a key 
development, the adoption by the movement, of demands for reunification. 
Reporters in the crowd, including this writer, noticed the West German flag 
being waved and engaged the persons holding it in conversation. The leader, 
a Leipzig doctor, said the idea was a logical development if the regime was 
going to fall. Thereafter flags brought across by various parties from the 
West, and the demands for reunification, began to flourish. 
 
Helmut Kohl, the Berlin Wall and German reunification  
 
In the West, the change process, though much in the public mind, was much 
more an institutional one, to a large degree  managed by the Bonn government 
under Helmut Kohl. Political leaders  working hard at studying the pattern of 
events in the Eastern bloc, began diplomacy to try and manage a sweeping 
political, economic and social change in Europe. Coverage of this activity by 
the news media, although dealing with the unknown, was a relatively familiar 
matter of following a schedule of meetings and announcements, then 
understanding, interpreting and reporting. Managing imponderables in the 
theatre of street politics was always harder, if more exciting. For the review of 
what took place in this politicking, using the media record; 280 reports and 
features were surveyed, taking in both events coverage and commentaries from 
guest writers, viz academic specialists, or “insiders” such as Dr Henry 
Kissinger. 
The idea of a German reunification had insinuated itself into the flow of events 
and debate by September 1989, and one outcome of the media review was to 
discover the accuracy of the Americans’ understanding of the situation 
throughout. The United States Ambassador at Bonn, Vernon Walters, 
presumably with access to US and German intelligence, offered periodic, and 
prescient public statements. In a radio interview, quoted in the International 
Herald Tribune on 4 September he said the exodus of East Germans through 
Hungary showed it was “abnormal to have two Germanies” and he believed 
Germany “could be reunited in the near future” (Duffield 2009 183). Few others 
dared to make that surmise at that moment.  
The federal German constitution had of course been designed to admit the five 
Eastern Lander to the republic after a free public vote, so that in legal terms 
reunification could be done with seamless ease. Kohl moved towards this 
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determinedly, in a process public enough for news media to construct in “real 
time” a dependable historical narrative, which can be understood as a 
succession of main episodes. 
These were:  his prompt moves, mentioned above, to set up accommodations 
with the other members of the European Community, which entailed the notion 
of Germany in a wider, and strong European Union; a special arrangement 
made with Hungary to help the border crossers; and his realisation that the 
moment was at hand, thanks especially to the demonstrations of emphatic public 
opinion in the GDR, to take power and secure reunification – illustrated through 
key incidents at Dresden and then Bonn. The West German state also assisted 
intimately in international dealings -- diplomatic juggling, deal-making and 
formal settlements the situation was demanding.  
 
Agreement on the border crossers 
The West German government had struck an agreement with Hungary on opening 
its border, and assisting the travelers, at the end of August. Reasonably thorough 
reports came to light almost immediately of a visit to Bonn by the Hungarian 
Prime Minister, Miklos Nemeth, and Foreign Minister, Gyula Horn, though there 
were no announcements or briefings until after their return home. The 
government of Hungary said the emigration issue was a matter for the two 
Germanies;  its own role was just to give helpful support. It received West 
German economic guarantees  not disclosed until later, the sums withheld from 
journalists at the time; the financial side of the agreement could be inferred but 
not confirmed. The GDR classed it a “trade in humans”. Later Kohl would 
repeatedly thank the Hungarians for their courage in a crisis. Reportage of this 
sometimes elusive procedure included articles in The Australian 23.9.89, ABC 
Radio 17.9.89, The Times 15.9.89, and the International Herald Tribune, 26-
27.8.89 and 11.9.89.  
 
Going ahead towards reunification 
Kohl’s  Ten-point Plan given to the Bundestag in November proposed an 
orderly and democratic movement towards reunification but without a 
timetable. It demanded an open democratic system in the GDR, and a model 
was offered for confederating the two republics,  through the work of 
commissions in policy fields including the economy, environment, transport, 
technology, health and culture. All countries of Eastern and Central Europe that 
moved to adopt democratic systems might go into a widened European 
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Community – as it was to transpire. The GDR, moving from one “reform” 
administration to another, agreed to hold free elections in 1990. 
This was a patient approach, but the West German Chancellor who had already 
denounced communism in the Bundestag as a “total failure”, immediately after 
the opening of the Wall, jettisoned that approach following his visit to Dresden on 
Tuesday 19.12.89 -- the day after the appearance of FRG flags in Leipzig. At 
Dresden there were more flags; crushing crowds shouted “we are one people”, 
and Kohl said, he felt impelled to utter the word “fatherland” in his address – to 
wild applause. He has not published a memoir but later gave extended interviews, 
including one (ABC RN 1999)  in which he said the Dresden incident had 
decided him to press for reunification.  
So, suddenly dropping “two Germanies” negotiations with the GDR, Kohl 
would bank on victory in the March elections in East Germany, then to move to 
reunification on the Bundesrepublik model in October 1990. Journalists 
attending a large gathering of East and West German Ministers at Bonn on 
13.2.90, to discuss the joint commissions, were alerted to the change when no 
communique was offered. German journalists told that voting intention polls in 
the GDR had started indicating a conservative, pro-reunification landslide. The 
seventeen GDR Ministers returned home effectively empty handed; there was 
even equivocation over a prior agreement against deploying the Deutschmark in 
the East --  the reunified country would have the Deutschmark. Once again the 
unexpected turn in events was reported and explained from many media sources 
including, from Australia ABC Radio, and ABC TV 14.2.90.  
 
International agreements and legal arrangements 
In the welter of diplomatic action in the last three months of 1989, Kohl 
achieved acceptance of the idea of a reunified Germany in the concept of a 
“Germany within Europe”. With chaos in  East Germany from late November – 
government in paralysis, millions moving outside the country, rolling 
demonstrations virtually in every town --  a settlement was negotiated among 
the FRG and its European partners, the United States, the GDR and Soviet 
Union. There was summitry at Brussels, Malta, Paris and Strasbourg, and 
organisation of the “4+2” agreement -- to formally end  the World War II 
settlement and division of Berlin among the former allies. At one crucial point 
in the decision-making on “4+2” Kohl met Gorbachev at Moscow; the US 
Secretary of State James Baker arriving there the next day, to help finalise 
instructions for officials of the six governments, gathered around a table in 
Berlin.   
Striving to realise the European idea                                                                                  Duffield 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Ejournalist.com.au                                                                                                                97 
 The United States had taken an early stand, that it did not share European 
apprehensions about Germany; would support the general idea of reunification 
within an expanded European framework, and would itself expect to remain 
with Germany in a restructured NATO. This was called the “Baker Doctrine” 
after a speech by Secretary Baker in Berlin on 12.12.89. “In reaffirming United 
States support for eventual German reunification President George Bush [GH 
Bush 1988-92] has sought to reduce British and French resistance to the 
growing international role of West Germany”, wrote an informed commentator 
(Fitchett, 28-29.10.89).  
On the European side, President Francois Mitterrand acquired a pivotal role, 
achieving in direct talks with Kohl, notably at Bonn in early November, the 
famous “deal” whereby France would accept reunification and Germany would 
underwrite the Euro, by committing to the 1992 monetary union. He had 
received sufficient assurances about German intentions to be able to present a 
“soft French line” when, in his national role and as occupant of the rotational 
EC Presidency, he met President Bush at Martinique in December. He accepted 
Baker’s proposals on a future European “architecture”; recognising that a 
“proper balance” would be maintained using the EC institutional framework, 
and that the USA would not be decoupling itself from Europe. Therefore, in the 
world of institutional politics, the main steps towards achieving Germany’s 
reunification, harmoniously, were linked-in with the development of the 
European Community --  by the Century’s end, the new European Union. 
 
An die Freude  …an Ode to Joy     
The “Wall” announcement on Thursday night 9.11.89 was a sensation both 
because of its content and the manner of delivery by the politburo 
spokesperson, Gunter Schabowski. The present writer, there to report from 
the media conference, later described his disclosure of the decision to permit 
open access to the West, as “maladroit, performed by a spokesperson who 
did not appear to have a firm grasp on the information or its implications” 
(Duffield 2009 184). Even so the telecast event was grasped fully by East 
Germans who successfully began demanding to cross over, throughout the 
night. An exit permit system was set up but the border police detailed to hand 
out the cards were literally pushed aside in the rush. Equally, while there was 
astonishment among news media present, there was no doubt about the fact 
of what had taken place, reported on immediately and accurately as the 
historical milestone that it was. Some of the headlines are listed in Appendix 
2.    
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A new Party politburo had been cobbled together and approved the decision 
at its first meeting, plainly seeking to stabilise the country, and so, to hold on 
to government. Public arguments emerged that the opening of the Wall had 
not really been intended, but Shabowski did stipulate, that officials had been 
instructed to grant all applications for the new permits. He said much later:  
“After I’d been talking for about an hour I thought well the press 
conference is over and I nearly left out my final points. But I did 
remember and I began shuffling around in my papers, and as I did so, I 
looked up at the world’s press and said, oh yes and I want to inform you 
that the party has decided to open up the border to enable people to travel. 
After a second of stunned silence the questions started coming, and two 
questions made me hesitate. One journalist asked when, and I looked at 
my notes again and read out, with immediate effect. And then the second 
question was whether this included Berlin, and I had another moment of 
doubt because suddenly I realised we hadn’t informed the Soviets. But our 
draft had said that it was included so I just shut my eyes, plunged in head 
first, and explained that it did indeed include Berlin … Well, I thought, it’s 
too late; the Soviets can’t do anything now anyway” (ABC Radio 
National, 1999). 
  Symbolism entailed in the events that followed, was telling. The 
spontaneous street party, a triumph of the human spirit, was international. 
The Wall, it transpired, was truly a hated thing among humanity. It could be 
expected that embedding a reunited Germany in a family of nations, the 
European Union, was well within the scope of the imagination of citizens. At 
the  reunification ceremony less than one year later, 3.10.90, they waved 
thousands of German flags, and the European banner; the German music of 
that hour, the Ode to Joy (Beethoven 9, 4), was adopted as the anthem of the 
EU. The German President, Rikard von Weizsacker, saw the emerging order 
as multi-cultural and committed to an ethic of freedom: “Never before had I 
experienced an event taking place on German soil where so many people 
around the globe shared our joy … There was complete unanimity among all 
political camps in Germany that after unification we wanted to be even more 
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Futures for news media 
The 1989 experience was a test that demonstrated ways in which news media 
will operate as the “first draft of history”. Histories to date have not digressed 
from the range of facts and the interpretations being published in that year, as 
it all happened. News media today have developing technological strengths 
that may see this go further as a resource for knowledge. Accountability has 
grown with interactivity in the digital sphere and with the unprecedented 
daily public archiving of thousands of media products world-wide. Published 
journalism can be routinely and transparently retrieved, challenged and 
corrected; it is available to be studied by anybody, and so the news of the 
world is now a gigantic engine for research and understanding, a source of 
tested and testable information and thought. The model of 1989, when 
complex politics turned into a street party, and all had to be noted and 
explained, may be the precedent for the way that questions of history are to 
be grappled with in this Century.                  
       
Futures for Europe 
The European Union saw itself transformed by the change in the former 
Eastern bloc. Its Maastricht reforms would enable greater integration of the 
member states, and because of that, lives of Europeans in respect of many 
things, like the money they use, where they might go for a job, or what they 
might study, are shared. The new participants from the East came unheralded 
into that more integrated model. Because of the 1992 changes the “new” 
Europe would not be a loose customs union or a smaller “United Nations”, 
and the new players would not object.  Divorce from the former Soviet 
Union, the occupying power, was one clear economic, political and also 
cultural motivation for Eastern Europe to change. Another was the drive to 
get rich; integrating with a prosperous European economy in the West would 
seem a legitimate, high priority to survivors of the years of insufficiency. As 
well, as people had been chanting in  the streets, they needed freedom. 
Since 1989 EU membership has grown from 12 to 27; taking in five new 
“Western” states and ten from the former Eastern bloc, see Appendix 3. The 
GDR was absorbed into membership through reunification. The enlargement 
has created economic costs in support for new member countries with their 
lower GDP; but the EU collectively accounts for some 30% of world gross 
national product; its population since 1989 has been increased by nearly 45% 
to 495-million; in land mass, omitting the former Soviet Union, it now 
accounts for the shape and virtual entirety of the map. 
Striving to realise the European idea                                                                                  Duffield 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Ejournalist.com.au                                                                                                                100 
Conclusion 
This report on research initiated in 1989 concludes that mass media produced 
valid and highly instructive accounts of the historical change that took place. 
The narrative above draws heavily on the day by day work of the media. The 
report shows the media’s, and the world’s ready recognition of the main 
processes of German reunification and the creation of the expanded 
European Union; stimulated, with limited recognition at the time, by the 
other process of the failure of the Soviet Union. It finds that work done on 
histories since 1989 backs up the essential narrative and interpretative 
commentaries provided by the news media. A third source of information for 
this research, the set of reflective commentaries of journalists from the time, 
is an illuminating source from the perspective of participants in the field. The 
journalists’ contribution comes into its own in telling how facts are 
assembled. This is especially useful for understanding the character of a new 
kind of chronicle of life this Century– the flood of daily media, ever-
accessible and kept on record. 
 The methodology employed in this research has proved appropriate for 
determining the significance of events and historical processes. The 
researcher was well-positioned as an observer, a journalist reporting in 
Europe during the crucial months. Reflection,  then consultation with 
colleagues from the time,  put a structure on the preserved impressions: news 
media had needed to play a double game, informal reporting of the catch-is / 
catch-can movement in the streets, and close monitoring of institutional 
politics and formal international diplomacy. The research has clarified ideas 
about the role of mass media and likely futures for media in a time of 
immense advances in information and communications technology. A 
powerful capacity to archive and index reportage by journalists that 
previously would be lost overnight, has provided an unprecedented 
opportunity to monitor and interpret historical events precisely and fast. 
So the data gathering for the research was triangulated, using as well as the 
interviews, both the review of news published over the crucial period 
(July1989 to January 1990) and histories written in the ten-years after 
November 1989. This approach has enabled the writer to present an 
interpretative narrative, establishing main themes, causes and effects. 
Significantly the compiled media accounts, looked at with hindsight, present 
themselves as the prime source, truly invaluable for establishing what 
occurred, why and with what impacts. The work done interviewing 
journalists became an important supplement to that review of their archived 
work. It would confirm aspects of the media narrative. Importantly it also 
served to explain the mentality deployed for news gathering, and how the 
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account comes together – the way facts will emerge and their significance 
become recognised.  
Historical writing was being produced from the moments of the crisis, for 
example with the British writer Garton Ash shadowing the Czechoslovak 
dissidents as they planned their strategies, in the Velvet Revolution. Yet 
history perforce operates by interpreting, after the event. In this, the 
retrospective writing at each point has confirmed the hasty fact-production 
and interpretation given by the news media. There is an uncanny orthodoxy 
and absence of revisionism among all accounts, and kinds of accounts, of the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, and the historical processes attending that event. It 
was not always so, that the news record would be the main record; but the 
situation with pervasive media and precision information management today 
can make this occur – and as already noted, studies like the contribution of 
the panel of journalists in this case will add to understanding of the way it 
takes place    
As the above short history has shown, the method deployed, using three 
sources, made it possible to identify, in an interpretative way how key 
episodes shaped the history (the Polish elections in June 1989; Gorbachev’s 
visit to East Berlin in October; the meetings between West German and 
Hungarian heads of government over the “border crossers” from the GDRF; 
the incident of the decision not to impose a “Chinese” solution on the 
demonstrators in Leipzig; the Mitterrand-Kohl agreement on acceptance of 
both German reunification and the single market and the Euro).  
 
Likewise key personalities were seen to be confronting their choices, 
(Gorbachev deciding not to maintain support for the satellite states; Kohl 
deciding in East Germany, in December, to move for reunification). Major 
outcomes have been documented through the media record. The 1992 
expansion of the European Union, its joint currency and inclusion of the 
Eastern European states, is shown to be, at least in major part, the product of 
the events of 1989.  German reunification was shown to be both a direct 
consequence, and intimately connected with the remaking of the EU. This 
research has also been able to help explain the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
as so much of Gorbachev’s ultimately futile manoeurvring was carried out in 
Europe; the trail of facts entailed in the news of his activities there, connects 
with what is now known about the inevitable disintegration of the state 
apparatus. Again, the best of our knowledge of these phenomena, raw and 
refined, is from the news media, as the principal organised recording and 
documenting institutions active over the time in question. Their grand 
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compilation, checked against other accounts, which can be thorough, will 
have lasting use.     
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Appendix 2 
News headlines 
• “The Iron Curtain Torn Open: Berliners Cross the Wall to 
Freedom”, TheTimes, 10.11.89. 
• “In a Gamble, a Symbol Falls”, IHT, 10.11.89. 
• “The Berlin Wall Crumbles Into History”, Guardian Weekly, 
19.11.89. 
• “The Wall Comes Tumbling Down”, The Australian, 10.11.89. 
• “After twenty-eight years the Berlin Wall has become an 
irrelevance”, ABC current affairs radio, AM, 10.11.89.  
• “In an historic night in East Berlin tens of thousands of East 
Germans have breached the Wall which has divided their city for 






• Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Germany (FRG), Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom 
(member states  in 1989)   
• Austria, Finland, Sweden (admitted in 1995) 
• Cyprus, Malta (admitted in 2004) 
• Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania (former Soviet republics admitted in 
2004) 
• Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia (former 
communist states admitted in 2004) 
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This article was first prepared as a paper delivered at “Europe Twenty Years 
after the Fall of the Berlin Wall”, a conference of the National Centre for 
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